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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel free-space quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) system using subcarrier intensity-
modulation (SIM) binary phase-shift-keying (BPSK) and dual-
threshold/direct-detection (DT/DD) receiver with an avalanche
photodiode (APD). The proposed system enables the adoption
of well-developed analytical models in conventional free-space
optical (FSO) communications and achieves the QKD function
with a simple configuration. We analytically investigate the design
criteria for transmitter and receiver, in particular, the modulation
depth and the setting for dual-threshold in the context of security
requirement of QKD systems. The quantum bit error rate
(QBER) and the ergodic secret-key rate of the proposed system
are analytically derived in closed-form expressions, considering
the channel loss, atmospheric turbulence modeled by the log-
normal distribution, and receiver noises. Monte-Carlo (M-C)
simulations are also implemented to validate the analytical
results, and numerical results confirm the feasibility of the
proposed system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the primary and
well-developed applications of quantum communications that
allows secret keys sharing between two parties (respectively,
named Alice and Bob) in the presence of eavesdropper(s) [1].
The first QKD protocol, widely known as BB84 protocol, was
proposed by Bennett and Brassard [2], by which the legitimate
sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) can achieve the secret-
key sharing by the use of randomly generated signals using
non-orthogonal quantum states. Over the years, two major
implementation methods of QKD protocol, namely discrete
variable (DV) and continuous variable (CV), have been pro-
posed. While the key information is encoded on the properties
of single photons such as the phase or polarization in DV-
QKD systems [3], the quadrature variables of coherent states
are used in CV-QKD [4]. Compared to DV-QKD, CV-QKD is
much easier to implement as it is compatible with the standard
optical telecommunication technologies and enables higher
key generation rates by using heterodyne/homodyne detection
instead of the single-photon counters. CV-QKD scheme has
been theoretically studied and experimentally implemented
both over optical fiber [5]-[8] and free-space optical (FSO)
links [9]-[12].
The key issue with CV-QKD system comes from the hetero-
dyne/homodyne detection receiver, which results in high cost
due to the requirement of the sophisticated phase-stabilized
local light at the receiver. To further simplify CV-QKD sys-
tems, intensity modulation with dual-threshold/direct detection
(DT/DD) over fiber CV-QKD systems has been recently
proposed employing on-off keying (OOK) with PIN receivers
[13]. The channel-state information (CSI) is required at the
receiver to optimize the dual thresholds, and CSI estimation
can be easily done in the optical fiber environment due to the
non-fading channel characteristics.
In this paper, we propose a novel free-space CV-QKD
system using DT/DD and subcarrier-intensity modulation bi-
nary phase-shift-keying (SIM/BPSK) signaling. Practically,
CSI estimation over fading channels in case of OOK signaling
is complicated due to the asymmetry of binary signals (noise
variances are different in bits “0” and “1”). Therefore, the
use of SIM/BPSK signaling whose signals of bit “0” and “1”
are symmetric over the “zero” level will relax the CSI esti-
mation over the atmospheric fading channels. To confirm the
feasibility of the proposed system, we analytically investigate
the criteria for transmitter and receiver settings, especially, the
modulation depth and the selection of values for the dual-
threshold to maintain the security in QKD systems. Also, we
analytically study the performance of the proposed system
by deriving, in closed-form expressions, the quantum bit-
error rate (QBER) and the ergodic secret-key rate, taking into
account effects of atmospheric channel and receiver noises.
In the performance analysis, the log-normal distribution is
adopted to model the atmospheric turbulence, and the im-
pact of different channel conditions on the QBER and the
ergodic secret-key rate is comprehensively discussed. Monte-
Carlo (M-C) simulations are also implemented to confirm the
validity of the analytical results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II first revisits the BB84 QKD protocol and then highlights
the design concept and the proposed system model. The
atmospheric channel model is described in Section III. In
Section IV, the system performance is theoretically analyzed,
and selected numerical results are discussed in Section V.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. DESIGN CONCEPT AND PROPOSED SYSTEM MODEL
A. BB84 Protocol
The conventional BB84 QKD protocol can be described in
four steps as follows.
Step 1: Alice randomly chooses between two linear polar-
ization bases
⊕
or
⊗
for every bit that she wants to send.
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Fig. 1. The probability density function (PDF) of Bob’s received signal over
turbulence fading channel, d0 and d1 are two levels of the DT.
For each chosen basis, Alice sends a random bit value, “0” or
“1”, using the following set of polarization codes
0→
{
0◦ if
⊕
was chosen
−45◦ if ⊗ was chosen, (1)
1→
{
90◦ if
⊕
was chosen
45◦ if
⊗
was chosen. (2)
Step 2: At the receiver, Bob randomly selects a basis to
measure each photon and has a detection only if he chooses
the same basis as Alice. Bob then assigns the corresponding
bit values to detected photons.
Step 3: Through a public channel, Alice broadcasts her basis
choice for each bit of her raw key, but not the bit value. Bob
then reveals on which detected photons he used the same basis
(without revealing the bit value he assigned to each one). They
both discard photon measurements where Bob used a different
basis, which is 50% on average, leaving the remaining bits as
their sifted keys.
Step 4: In practice, Bob’s sifted key may contain errors
due to eavesdropping or channel/detector imperfections. To
identify and remove the erroneous bits, Alice and Bob perform
information reconciliation over the public channel, which is a
form of error correction to ensure both sifted keys are identical,
forming their error-free secret key.
The security of BB84 protocol, according to the laws of
quantum mechanics, lies in the fact that Alice encodes her
information in non-orthogonal states
⊕
or
⊗
so that an
eavesdropper Eve cannot sufficiently distinguish the two states
and errors unavoidably occur when she eavesdrops [14].
B. Design Concept
In this section, we describe the design concept for the
implementation of QKD by using SIM/BPSK signaling and
DT/DD. Details are as follows.
Step 1: Alice transmits SIM/BPSK modulated signals with
small modulation depth, corresponding to binary random num-
bers “0” or “1”, over the free-space channel.
Step 2: The modulated signals are directly detected at
Bob’s receiver. Fig. 1 shows the probability density function
(PDF) of Bob’s received BPSK signal after the DD by an
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Fig. 2. The probability density function (PDF) of Eve’s received signal over
turbulence fading channel with the optimal threshold dE .
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avalanche photodiode (APD). Two levels of the DT, d0 and
d1, are symmetric over the “zero” level. The distribution of the
received signal has two peaks corresponding to Alice’s bit “0”
and bit “1”, which overlap with each other as the modulation
depth is small. For the detected value x, the detection rule can
be expressed as
Decision =
⎧⎨⎩0 if (x ≤ d0)1 if (x ≥ d1)X otherwise, (3)
where X represents the case that Bob creates no bit, which
corresponds to the case of wrong basis selection in the BB84
protocol.
Step 3: Using a classical channel, Bob notifies Alice of the
time he created bits from detected signals. Now, Alice and
Bob share an identical bit string, which is the sifted key. By
adjusting d0 and d1 in Step 2, and obtaining the CSI estimation
at the receiver, the probability of sift can be controlled.
Step 4: As in the BB84 protocol, further information rec-
onciliation can then be implemented over the public channel
to obtain the error-free secret key.
The security of this design concept can be explained as
follows. Firstly, the modulation depth of the SIM/BPSK signal
is very small. As a result, if Eve, in the beam-splitting
attack for example, tries to decode the key using the optimal
threshold (which is dE at “zero” as illustrated in Fig. 2 in case
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Fig. 4. Block diagram of the proposed free-space QKD system using
SIM/BPSK and APD receiver.
of SIM/BPSK), she will suffer from a high error rate. With
a proper setting of the modulation depth at the transmitter
design, we can guarantee that Eve’s error rate can be close
to the probability that Eve chooses the incorrect basis in
BB84 protocol. Secondly, as mentioned in Steps 2 and 3, the
probability of sift can also be controlled by Bob via the DT
setting. Additionally, Eve’s signal fluctuation is uncorrelated
with Bob’s since they arise from quantum noise and channel
fading. In case of intercept-resend eavesdropping by Eve, the
probability that Alice and Bob identify the presence of Eve is
sufficiently high with short key length (further discussions on
this issue with validated data will be provided in Section V -
Numerical Results).
Figure 3 summarizes key characteristics of the proposed
system in comparison with DV-QKD and CV-QKD systems.
The key features of the proposed system include simplicity
and cost-efficiency, since phase-stabilized local laser or ex-
pensive single-photon detector is not required. In particular,
Intensity Modulation/Direct Detection (IM/DD) systems are
commercially available for high data rate, i.e., Gigabits per
second (Gbps) and most advantageous for single-wavelength
data transmission over short distances.
C. Proposed System Model
Figure 4 presents a block diagram of the proposed free-
space CV-QKD system using SIM/BPSK and DT/DD receiver
with an APD. At the transmitter, the source data d(t) is first
modulated onto a radio frequency (RF) subcarrier signal using
BPSK scheme in which bits “0” and “1” are represented by
two different phases 180◦ apart. The subcarrier signal m(t) is
sinusoidal having both positive and negative values; therefore
a DC bias is added to m(t) before it is used to modulate a
continuous-wave laser beam.
Let Pt(t) denote the transmitted power of the modulated
laser beam, we have Pt (t) = P2 [1 + δm (t)] , where P
represents the peak transmitted power, δ is the intensity mod-
ulation depth to avoid overmodulation (−1 < δm (t) < 1).
m(t) = A(t)g(t)cos(2πfct+ aiπ), where A(t) is the subcar-
rier amplitude, g(t) is the rectangular pulse shaping function,
fc is the subcarrier frequency, and ai ∈ [0, 1] represents the
ith binary data. For the sake of simplicity, we normalize the
power of m(t) to unity.
At the receiver, the incoming optical field is passed through
an optical bandpass filter (OBPF) before being converted into
an electrical signal through DD at the APD. A standard RF
coherent demodulator is employed to recover the source data
dˆ(t). Over an atmospheric channel with channel coefficient
h(t), the electrical signal at the output of the APD at the
receiver can be written as
ir (t) = ℜg¯ P
2
h (t) [1 + δcos(2πfct+ aiπ)] + n (t) , (4)
where ℜ = ηq
h˜v
is the responsivity (in units of A/W) of the APD
with η is the quantum efficiency, q is the electron charge, h˜
is the Planck’s constant, v is the optical frequency; g¯ is the
APD average gain, and n(t) is the receiver noise. For BPSK
demodulation, the output signal r(t) is demodulated by the
reference signal cos(2πfct) as
r (t)= ir(t)cos(2πfct) =
{
i0 = − 14ℜg¯P δh(t) + n(t)
i1 =
1
4ℜg¯P δh(t) + n(t)
, (5)
where i0 and i1 represent the received current signals for
bit “0” and bit “1”, respectively. Assuming that the dark
current is negligible, the receiver noises composing of shot
noise, background noise and thermal noise can be modeled as
additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN) with high accuracy
[15]. Thus, n(t) is the zero-mean AWGN with variance
σ2N = σ
2
sh+σ
2
b+σ
2
th, where σ
2
sh, σ
2
bkg , and σ
2
th are respectively
the variances of the APD shot noises caused by the received
signal and background radiation, and receiver thermal noise,
which can be expressed as
σ2sh = 2qg¯
2ℜFA
(
1
4
P δh
)
∆f , (6)
σ2b = 2qg¯
2ℜFAPb∆f , (7)
σ2th =
4kBTFn
RL
∆f , (8)
where FA = kAg¯+
(
2− 1g¯
)
(1− kA) denotes the excess noise
factor with kA is the ionization factor, Fn is the amplifier noise
figure, Pb is the average received background radiation power,
∆f =
Rb
2 with Rb is the system bit rate, T is the receiver
temperature in Kelvin degree, and RL is the APD’s load
resistance. After demodulating process, the sampled electrical
signal at the output of the receiver is used to reproduce the
source transmitted binary bits “0” and “1” based on DT/DD
as described in Section II-B.
III. ATMOSPHERIC CHANNEL MODELS
In our model, the channel coefficient h can be described
as h = hlht, where hl is the channel loss including atmo-
spheric attenuation and geometric spreading loss, and ht is
the atmospheric turbulence-induced fading.
The channel loss can be formulated as
hl =
A
π
(
θ
2L
)2 exp(−βlL), (9)
in which A = π(D/2)2 is the area of the receiver aperture
with D is the diameter, θ is the angle of divergence, βl is the
attenuation coefficient, and L is the transmission distance in
kilometers [16]-[17].
Inhomogeneities in the temperature and pressure of the
atmosphere lead to refractive index variations along the trans-
mission path, which is commonly known as atmospheric
turbulence. In this paper, the log-normal distribution model is
adopted. Thus, the distribution of turbulence-induced fading
coefficient ht can be expressed as [18]
fht(h
t) =
1√
8πhtσx
exp
(
− [ln(h
t)− 2µx]2
8σ2x
)
, (10)
where µx and σ2x are the mean and standard variance of
log-amplitude fluctuation. To ensure that the fading does
not attenuate or amplify the average power, we normalize
the fading coefficient so that E[ht] = 1, with E[·] denotes
the statistical expectation. Doing so requires the choice of
µx = −σ2x. Assuming plane wave propagation, σ2x can be
given as [16]
σ2x = 0.307
(
2π
λ
)7/6
L11/6C2n, (11)
where λ is the wavelength and L is the transmission distance in
meters. C2n stands for the refractive index structure coefficient.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Quantum Bit Error Rate
The quantum bit error rate (QBER) is given as [3]
QBER =
Perror
Psift
, (12)
where Perror and Psift are the probabilities of error and sift,
respectively. In the proposed system, Psift corresponds to
the probability that Bob can detect bits “0” and “1” using
the dual-threshold detection, and Perror is the probability
that Bob decides “0” when “1” is received and “1” when
“0” is received. These probabilities can be calculated through
the joint probabilities between Alice and Bob as Psift =
PA,B(0, 0)+PA,B(0, 1)+PA,B(1, 0)+PA,B(1, 1), and Perror=
PA,B(0, 1) + PA,B(1, 0), where PA,B(a, b) (a, b ∈ {0, 1})
denotes the joint probability that Alice’s bit a coincides with
Bob’s bit b. Using two detection thresholds d0 and d1, the
joint probabilities, averaged over the fading channel, can be
expressed as
PA,B(a, 0) =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
ia − d0
σN
)
fht
(
ht
)
dht, (13)
PA,B(a, 1) =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
d1 − ia
σN
)
fht
(
ht
)
dht, (14)
where a ∈ {0, 1}, i0 = −14ℜg¯P δhlht and i1 = −i0. Q(·)
∆
=
1√
2π
∫∞
0 exp(−t2/2)dt is the Gaussian Q-function.
To determine d0 and d1, we propose the DT selections with
d0 = E[i0] − ζ
√
σ2N , and d1 = E[i1] + ζ
√
σ2N , where ζ is
the dual-threshold scale coefficient to adjust d0 and d1. This
dual-threshold selections depend on the modulation depth δ
and the variance of noise σN adjusted by ζ. E[i0] and E[i1]
are the mean values of i0 and i1, respectively. Thus, E[i0] =
− 14ℜg¯P δhl and E[i1] = 14ℜg¯P δhl as E[h] = E[hlha] = hl
with E[ha] = 1.
To derive the closed-form expressions for the joint proba-
bilities in (13) and (14), using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature
formula
∫∞
−∞ g (y) exp(−y2) ≈
∑k
i=−k,i ̸=0 ωig (xi) [19], we
have
PA,B(a, 0)≈ 1
2
√
π
k∑
i=−k,i ̸=0
ωiQ
(
∓14ℜg¯P δe2
√
2σxxi+2µx−d0
σN−i
)
,
(15)
PA,B(a, 1)≈ 1
2
√
π
k∑
i=−k,i ̸=0
ωiQ
(
d1± 14ℜg¯P δe2
√
2σxxi+2µx
σN−i
)
,
(16)
where
σN−i=
√
2qFAg¯2ℜ
[
hlP δe2
√
2σxxi+2µx+Pb
]
∆f+
4kbTFn
RL
∆f.
(17)
Here, k is the order of approximation, {ωi} and {xi}
(i = −k,−k + 1, ...− 1, 1, 2, ..., k) are the weight factors and
the zeros of the Hermite polynomial, respectively [19]. From
(15) and (16), the closed-form expression for the QBER can
be obtained. It is noted that k = 10 gives accurate results for
this approximation [18].
B. Ergodic Secret-Key Rate
To validate the security of the proposed system, especially in
the case of beam-splitting eavesdrop, we analyze the ergodic
secret-key rate over the atmospheric fading channels. First,
we denote H(B) and H(E) as the information entropy of
Bob and Eve, respectively. The conditional entropies of Bob-
Alice and Eve-Alice are denoted as H(B|A) and H(E|A),
respectively. The mutual information I(A;B) and I(A;E)
are defined as the estimation of the information shared be-
tween Alice and Bob, and that shared between Alice and
Eve, respectively. Thus, I(A;B) = H(B) − H(B|A) and
I(A;E) = H(E) −H(E|A), in which the key is said to be
secure if I(A,B) is higher than I(A,E) [20]. As a result,
we define the ergodic secret-key rate S as the maximum
transmission rate at which the eavesdropper is unable to
decode any information, which is given as
S = I(A;B)− I(A;E). (18)
1) Mutual information between Alice and Bob: Alice and
Bob share information over the channel as depicted in Fig.
5, where xi (i ∈ {1, 2}) i.e. bits “0” and “1”, and yj (j ∈
{1, 2, 3}) i.e. bits “0”, X , and “1”, respectively. p and q denote
the channel transition probabilities. α and (1 − α) are the
probabilities of transmitting bits “0” and “1”. We define this
new type of channel as the binary erasure channel (BEC) with
x1 
x2 
y2 
y1 
y3 p 
p 
q 
q 
P (x1) = α
P (x2) = 1− α
Fig. 5. Diagram of the binary erasure channel (BEC) with errors between
Alice and Bob.
errors. Hence, the mutual information I(A;B) can be derived
as
I(A;B)= plog2(p)+(1−p−q)plog2(1−p−q)
−(αp+(1−α)(1−p−q))log2(αp+(1−α)(1−p−q))
−(α(1−p−q)+(1−α)p)log2((α(1−p−q)+(1−α)p)).
(19)
Details of the proof of (19) are omitted due to space limitation.
In our system, we have α = 0.5. p, q, and (1 − p − q) are
respectively the conditional probabilities that Bob creates bit
yj when Alice sends bit xi, which can be deduced from the
joint probabilities derived in Section IV-A.
2) Mutual information between Alice and Eve: In our
system, Eve obtains a bit string through eavesdropping, whose
bit values are partially identical to Alice’s. Thus, we can
consider that Alice and Eve share some information via binary
symmetric channel (BSC). As a result, the mutual information
I(A;E) can be given as
I(A;E) = 1 + elog2(p) + (1− e)log2(1− e), (20)
where e is Eve’s probability of error, which is defined as
e = PA,E(0, 1) + PA,E(1, 0) with PA,E(0, 1) and PA,E(1, 0)
are the joint probabilities that Eve falsely detects Alice’s
transmitted bits using threshold detection dE = 0. Similar
to Section IV-A, using Gauss-Hermite quadrature formula,
PA,E(0, 1) and PA,E(1, 0), averaged over the fading channel,
can also be derived in closed-form expressions.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we investigate the criteria for transmitter
and receiver settings to maintain the security of the proposed
system under beam-splitting and intercept-resend attacks. Two
performance metrics, QBER and ergodic secret-key rate S,
are analytically analyzed and a good agreement with M-C
simulations is confirmed. It is assumed that the atmospheric
attenuation coefficient βl = 0.43 dB/km and the system is
operating at 1 Gbps.
In the beam-splitting attack, Eve tries to steal information
by tapping the transmitted signal. To defend against this attack,
Alice chooses a small value of modulation depth δ at the
transmitter so that Eve will suffer from a high error rate,
with dE = 0. When Eve is close to Alice, e.g., LA,E = 1
km, Fig. 6 shows the values of δ under different turbulence
strengths versus Eve’s probability of error e. To guarantee that
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e is sufficiently high, e.g., e > 10−1, the chosen values for
δ should be δ ≤ 0.4 for all cases. Particularly, under strong
turbulence C2n = 5× 10−14, Eve’s error is always higher than
10−1 for all values of δ.
Regarding the criteria for receiver design (at Bob), we can
control QBER and Psift by adjusting d0 and d1 through ζ,
as shown in Fig. 7. In this figure, the distance from Alice to
Bob is LA,B = 1 km. Our target is to control QBER ≤ 10−3
and Psift ≥ 10−2 so that the error is small enough while the
probability of sift is sufficient for Bob to receive information
from Alice. Doing so requires the choice of 1.4 ≤ ζ ≤ 2.35.
With the above design criteria at Alice and Bob, if Eve
uses intercept-resend attack, we can guarantee that the prob-
ability that Alice and Bob can detect the eavesdrop (i.e.
the probability they find disagreement in Step 3 over the
public channel and identify the presence of Eve), given by
PD = 1 − [(1 − e)Psift(1 − Perror)]n with n is the key
length, is sufficiently high. For example, when δ = 0.4, ζ = 2,
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Fig. 8. QBER versus transmission distance LA,B . δ = 0.4, ζ = 2, g¯ = 10,
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C2n = 10
−15 and n = 7, we have PD = 0.999999999.
Setting ζ = 2 and with δ = 0.4, the dual thresholds d0 and
d1 can be determined. Keeping this setting, Fig. 8 investigates
the QBER versus LA,B with varying peak transmitted power
P . It can be seen that the achievable LA,B at QBER = 10−3
can be significantly improved by increasing P , under weak
turbulence condition.
Finally, in Fig. 9, we look at another aspect of the perfor-
mance metric in receiver design by showing the ergodic secret-
key rate S versus ζ for different distances from Alice to Eve
LA,E (Eve is located further behind Bob). It is seen that there
is an optimal DT scale coefficient where the secret-key rate is
maximum. Nevertheless, we can only select 1.4 ≤ ζ ≤ 2.35
due to the constraint for receiver design. As a result, to
maximize the secret-key rate, it is necessary to select the
smallest possible ζ.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a novel free-space QKD system using
SIM/BPSK and DT/DD receiver with an APD. The design cri-
teria for transmitter and receiver, in particular, the modulation
depth and the setting for dual-threshold, were comprehensively
discussed. The QBER and the ergodic secret-key rate of the
proposed system were analytically derived in closed-form
expressions, considering the impact of atmospheric channel
and receiver noises. Analytical results and M-C simulations
confirmed the feasibility of the proposed system.
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